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OWNERSHIP, COMPETITION, AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
1. Introduction 
 Verrecchia (2001) categorizes disclosure research into three broad groups—
association-based, discretionary-based, and efficiency-based. Association-based research 
investigates the relation between exogenous disclosure and change in investors’ individual 
actions. Discretionary-based research investigates how firms use their discretion regarding 
information that does not require mandatory disclosure. Efficiency-based research examines 
unconditional disclosure choices characterized by endogenous consumers. Discretionary-
based research models the firm’s incentives or disincentives to disclose as a function of a 
range of variables including information asymmetry, agency costs, political costs, and 
proprietary costs.1 Verrecchia argues that these models of disclosure must establish a link 
between financial reporting and its economic consequences. While previous studies find 
significant relations between discretionary disclosures and variables such as size and 
leverage2, no study identifies a variable that enhances existing disclosure models and links 
financial reporting and its economic consequences.  
 In response to Verrecchia’s call for an economic-based argument for financial 
reporting we examine the industrial organisation and strategic management literature which 
suggests a new variable involving the internal and external environment of the firm.  Both 
Tirole’s The Theory of Industrial Organization (1990) and Schmalensee and Willig’s The 
Handbook of Industrial Organisation (1989) discuss the nature and role of competitive 
strategy which can be applied to the internal organization of the firm, for instance the effect 
of incentives within the firm on achieving competitive advantages. Porter (1981) adds that a 
successful firm must match its internal and external environment and further, a firm’s 
performance depends critically on the characteristics of the industry environment in which it 
operates.  In the early 1990s, an entire special issue of the Strategic Management Journal 
(Vol, 12, 1991) examines the relationship between strategic management and economics 
and indicates areas for future research utilising the linkage between the two disciplines.  
Further, Saloner (1991) adds that issues, intersecting the internal environment and the 
external environment are a growth area in economics. The external environment including 
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factors such as competition, combined with internal factors such as incentive schemes are 
important inputs to a firm’s decision making approach. 
 This study, will investigate whether a new variable representing the internal and 
external environments, combined with previously examined variables in the voluntary 
disclosure literature (see Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, Street and Gray, 2001, Mitchell 
et al, 1995) enhances the ability of the model to explain voluntary disclosure. The variable 
IOHI will measure the inside ownership of the firm combined with the level of industry 
competition of the firm. We focus on voluntary segment disclosures because they have 
been found to be value relevant in forecasting sales and profits.3 Our empirical analyses 
focus on firm’s segment disclosures for 2001 under the original Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB) standard and for 2002/2003 under the revised standard. This 
unique regulatory background featuring a change in segment reporting standard provides 
us with an additional test of robustness for the model featuring our IOHI variable. 
 Previous disclosure studies have found significant results for variables originating 
from agency, political cost, information asymmetry and proprietary cost theories.  Studies 
such as Berger and Hann (2002) and Harris (1998), for example, examine the impact of 
competition on disclosure, and Nagar et al (2003) examine the impact of ownership 
structure on disclosure. We acknowledge these findings and construct a disclosure model 
incorporating existing variables and our new variable IOHI. Our strong results demonstrate 
that the IOHI variable does in fact enhance the ability of the model explaining voluntary 
disclosure. We conduct a series of robustness tests on our IOHI variable and find that the 
significance of the IOHI variable is robust to the inclusion of variables measuring the 
change in standard, acquisitions and disposals of other firms and cross listing on the US 
stock exchange. 
 A greater understanding of the incentives to disclose financial information is timely 
as jurisdictions worldwide are currently undergoing international harmonization projects 
with accounting standards which will result in changes to disclosure practices. Australia is 
moving towards adopting the International Accounting Standard Board’s (IASB) 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by 2005, and the Financial Accounting 
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Standards Board is currently committed to a project with the IASB to harmonize their 
standards. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
institutional setting of AASB 1005 Segment Reporting. Section 3 summarizes the main 
hypotheses regarding discretionary disclosures. Section 4 outlines our model specification, 
and Section 5 describes the empirical measures and sample selection, and provides 
descriptive statistics. Section 6 reports the results of our empirical tests. Section 7 contains a 
discussion of the robustness tests, and Section 8 describes the main conclusions and suggests 
avenues for future research.  
2.  Institutional setting 
Segment reporting refers to the disclosure of results from operating in markets 
with different rates of profit, different degrees of risk, and different opportunities for 
growth. Previous research has shown that segment reporting disclosures are useful for 
investment decision-making as the disaggregated industry and geographic segment data 
can provide analysts and other users with additional information to appraise the different 
markets in which the company operates (Kochanek, 1974, Aitken, Czernkowski and 
Hooper, 1994).  Local and international standards require the disclosure of information 
regarding business and geographic segments. The Australian Accounting Standards 
Board (AASB) has released two standards on segment reporting: AASB 1005 Financial 
Reporting by Segments and the revised AASB 1005 Segment Reporting. The current U.S. 
standard is SFAS 131 Reporting Disaggregated Information about a Business Enterprise, 
and the current international standard is IAS 14 Segment Reporting. 
2.1 Segment Reporting Standards in Australia 
 Australia’s original segment standard AASB 1005 Financial Reporting by 
Segments was released in 1986 and required firms to disclose segment revenue, segment 
result, and the carrying amount of segment assets for both industry and geographical 
segments. In August 2000, the AASB issued the revised standard AASB 1005 Segment 
Reporting whereby firms are required to identify their segments in line with their internal 
organizational structure and internal reporting system.  This approach, known as the 
“management approach”4, differs markedly from the original “industry approach”. The 
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revised standard also allows firms to choose whether line of business (LOB) or geographic 
area (GEO) will be a primary or a secondary segment disclosure.5  The required disclosures 
for primary segments are much more extensive than for secondary segments. The standard 
stipulates that firms’ must disclose segment revenue, segment profit, segment assets, 
segment liabilities, acquisition of segment assets, depreciation and amortization of segment 
assets, other non-cash segment expenses, segment share of the net profit/result of associates 
or other investees and segment carrying amount of investments in the associates.  The 
revised standard also encourages voluntary disclosure of additional  information such as 
segment cash flows and segment non-cash revenues.. For secondary segments, the standard 
requires disclosure of segment revenues, the carrying amount of assets and the cost of 
property, plant and equipment, and intangible assets acquired during the period. A 
segment’s profit is not a required disclosure for secondary segments, under the revised 
AASB 1005.  
2.3  International Harmonization of Segment Standards 
 In recent years, there has been a trend towards increasing comparability in global 
financial reports. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is currently 
working on the implementation of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
with the aim to develop uniform, high quality financial reports.  By 2005, companies listed 
in Australia, New Zealand, and any European Union country will fully adopt the IFRS of 
the IASB. While the U.S. is not adopting IFRS, it is an important partner to the IASB and is 
working on projects to reduce the differences in FASB and IASB standards. The 
implementation of IFRS and the harmonization of standards internationally will have 
repercussions for companies in the preparation and presentation of financial reports.  
3.  Theoretical framework 
Positive accounting theory deals with managements’ motives in making 
accounting choices. Within this framework, disclosure research focuses on the role of 
capital market incentives in the firm’s disclosure decisions. Verrecchia (2001) 
categorizes disclosure research into three broad groups. First, “association-based” 
research investigates the relation between exogenous disclosure and the change in 
investors’ individual actions. Second, “discretionary-based” research investigates how 
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firms use their discretion in revealing information when reporting is not mandated. Third, 
“efficiency-based” research examines unconditional disclosure choices characterized by 
endogenous consumers. 
Discretionary-based disclosure research considers the incentives and disincentives 
for disclosing additional financial information in a capital market setting. Incentives include; 
mitigating the affects of information asymmetry, decreasing potential political costs and 
monitoring agents and therefore reducing agency costs. A disincentive for disclosing 
additional financial information would be the potential proprietary costs associated with the 
disclosure of information. A number of hypotheses have been tested. Table 1 summarizes 
past research in terms of hypotheses tested and test results. 
   
3.1  Information Asymmetry Hypothesis  
Informational asymmetry impedes efficient allocation of resources. It arises when 
markets do not perfectly aggregate private information, and can lead to higher transaction 
costs, lower liquidity, and, ultimately, mis-pricing of the firm’s shares. The effects of 
information asymmetry can be mitigated in a number of ways, including contracting, 
regulation, and the work of information intermediaries. Accounting disclosures are also a 
means of disseminating information to less well-informed parties. Several studies have 
examined the role of information asymmetry proxies and the presence of voluntary 
disclosures.  Botosan (1997), for example, examines analyst following as a proxy for 
information asymmetry and finds that firms with lower analyst following have a propensity 
for higher disclosure and consequently experience a reduction in their costs of capital. For 
firms with higher analyst following, she finds no significant relation. Previous studies have 
also found size to be associated with the level of information asymmetry.  Atiase (1985), 
Bamber (1987) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find that stock prices incorporate 
information about larger firms earlier than smaller firms.  King, Pownall and Waymire 
(1990) predict that disclosure will increase with firm size as the incentives for disclosure are 
greater for larger firms. Studies have also investigated the association between ownership 
and information asymmetry. Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) use the variable institutional 
ownership and find a link between increased disclosure and higher percentages of 
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institutional ownership. Jiambalvo, Rajgopal and Ventkatachalam (2002) find that in cases 
where firms’ have high percentages of institutional ownership, their current earnings are 
more likely to reflect future earnings.  These findings are further supported by studies which 
have used the variable diffused ownership (Mitchell et al 1995, Aitken et al 1997) and have 
concluded that an increasing percentage of significant owners is positively associated with 
voluntary disclosures. 
  
3.2 Political Costs 
Political costs may also explain discretionary disclosure decisions. Belkaoui and 
Karpik (1989) find that firms employ a number of devices (including discretionary 
disclosures) to avoid the attention of external parties such as government regulators, 
suppliers, and unions.6  Deegan and Gordon (1996) find that firms that are politically more 
visible to the market increase disclosures as a means of mitigating potential political costs. 
One inherent problem with the political cost studies, however, is that it is often difficult to 
distinguish the political cost hypothesis from other disclosure theories.  These studies also 
use the variable firm size as a proxy to measure for political costs. 
 
3.3 Agency Costs 
Agency costs arise when principals and agents have conflicting incentives.7  As a 
means of mitigating divergent interests, principals may use different incentives to monitor 
their agents. The possibilities include performance-based contracts, bonus share plans, debt 
covenants, audit committees, as well as increased disclosure. Past investigations document 
that firm characteristics such as firm size, leverage and fixed assets in place affect voluntary 
disclosures by influencing the degree of agency and contracting costs experienced by the 
firm (Bradbury, 1991, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). In their review of fourteen 
accounting choice studies, Holthausen and Leftwich (1983),  find support for the variables 
firm size and leverage.  
Several segment disclosure choice studies support the Holthausen and Leftwich 
findings.  Foster (1986) notes that firm size is the most commonly-used control variable 
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in disclosure studies and in segment disclosure studies it has also been a significant 
variable (McKinnon and Dalimunthe 1993, Bradbury 1992, Berger and Hann 2002). 
Studies have also reported a positive association between disclosure and being audited by 
an international auditing firm.   Street and Gray (2001) argues that a “big four or five” 
auditor encourages firms to be forthcoming in their disclosures as part of the monitoring 
process associated with reducing agency costs. Prior research has suggested an 
association between the proportion of fixed assets in place and voluntary disclosure.  
Firms exhibiting large proportions of fixed assets in place are expected to experience 
lower agency costs (Bradbury, 1992, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987) and consequently 
will have less incentive to voluntarily disclose. 
Studies have also examined the relationship between ownership structure and 
disclosure, examining variables such as directors’ shareholdings and CEO remuneration. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency costs increase with the proportion of 
outside capital. Nagar et al (2003) investigate the relation between disclosures and the 
level of CEO share ownership and stock performance remuneration, and find a positive 
relation between disclosure and CEO ownership.  In firm performance studies, insider 
ownership plays an important, albeit empirically ambiguous, role. Berle and Means 
(1932), for example, find an inverse correlation between ownership and firm 
performance. Demsetz (1983), on the other hand, argues there should be no relation 
between variation in ownership and firm performance because the ownership structure of 
a firm is a multidimensional variable and should be seen as an endogenous outcome of 
decisions that reflect the influence of shareholders. A recent study by Leung and Horwitz 
(2004) investigates voluntary segment reporting in Hong Kong firms and finds that 
voluntary segment disclosure decreases when the level of insider ownership increases 
above 25% of the total shares.  The agency problem transfers from a conflict between 
principals and agents to a conflict between the controlling and minority shareholders. 
 
3.4  Proprietary Costs 
The discretionary disclosure literature also considers theories that explain a firm’s 
decision not to disclose. Dye (2001) takes the position that, if disclosure is discretionary, 
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firms will release favorable information and choose not to disclose unfavorable 
information.8  Verrecchia (2001) considers the role of proprietary costs in explaining a 
firm’s decision to withhold the release of additional information. Proprietary costs arise 
when private information, if released, may harm the firm’s competitive position. 
Segment information is important to users of financial reports. Firm operations 
can vary significantly across line of business and geographic segments, and firm 
segments vary according to the rates of profit, levels of risk, and opportunities for 
growth. Segment disclosures contain value relevant information that may help investors 
and analysts predict future profits and revenues. At the same time, segment disclosure 
information may be useful to external (potentially adversarial) parties such as suppliers, 
employees, unions and competitors. Consequently, management must exercise discretion 
by taking into consideration the impact of the release of potentially harmful information 
to the market before disclosing it.  
 In determining an appropriate level of disclosure, firms will therefore consider 
factors such as the competitiveness of the industry in which they operate. The empirical 
evidence regarding the relation between competition and disclosure is mixed. On one 
hand, Verrecchia (1983) and Wagenhofer (1990) find that firms in more competitive 
industries provide less informative disclosures. On the other, some studies find that firms 
in less competitive industries provide less informative disclosures. Harris (1998) finds that 
operations in less competitive industries are less likely to be reported as industry segments. 
This suggests that managers attempt to conceal information that may allow rival firms to 
capture these profits. Hayes and Lundholm (1996), finds that a firm disaggregates 
consolidated information into segment information in a highly competitive environment 
in order to avoid the adverse selection problem.  
Firm performance is another determinant in the decision to disclose.  The 
empirical studies on the relation between firm performance and disclosure are mixed. 
Previous research (Lev and Penman, 1990) suggests that firms tend to be more 
forthcoming when the firm is experiencing favourable earnings results compared with 
when the firm is performing poorly (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). However, the 
competitive costs associated with segment disclosures tend to increase as the profitability 
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of the reporting entity increases (Prencipe, 2004). Berger and Hann (2002) also find that 
firms aggregate segment information when there are large variances in segment profits in 
order to protect abnormal profits.   
On balance, the literature appears to support the position that firms with low 
competition have higher proprietary costs, and, therefore, less incentive to disclose 
information to their competitors. Firms in less competitive industries have the potential to 
make abnormal profits and there is more scope for rivals in these industries to use the 
proprietary information disclosed.  However firms in more competitive industries, have 
greater incentive to disclose information in order to reduce information asymmetries. 
 
3.5 Summary of Disclosure Variables 
Previous studies investigating voluntary segment disclosures have focused on a 
range of variables originating from agency, information asymmetry, political costs and 
proprietary cost theories. A review of the voluntary disclosure literature reveals that firm 
size (LOGTA), ownership diffusion (OWNDIFF), leverage (LEV), big 5 auditor 
(AUDITOR), return (RETURN) and fixed assets in place (FAIP) are commonly tested 
variables. These variables can thus be expressed in the following model: 
( , , , , , )VD f OWNDIFF RETURN FAIP AUDITOR LEV LOGTA=                    (1) 
4.  Model specification 
 Verrecchia (2001) argues that disclosure research must establish a link between 
financial reporting and its economic consequences. In response to Verrecchia’s call for an 
economic-based argument for financial reporting, we examine the industrial organisation 
and strategic management literature. This literature suggests a potentially new variable 
which involves the internal and external environment of the firm.   
 Tirole’s The Theory of Industrial Organisation (1990) and Schmalensee and 
Willig’s The Handbook of Industrial Organisation (1989) discuss the nature and role of 
competitive strategy which can then be applied to the internal organisation of the firm. For 
example the existence of incentives such as directors’ shares and CEO remuneration can 
impact on the firm’s competitive position in the market. Porter (1981) argues that a 
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successful firm must match its internal competencies and values to its external environment.  
A firm’s performance in the marketplace depends critically on the characteristics of the 
industry environment in which it competes. Further, industrial organisation can contribute 
greatly to strategic decision making and exposure to strategic managements also has a 
positive influence on industrial organisational research. 
 In the early 1990s, a special issue of the Strategic Management Journal (Vol, 12, 
1991) examines the relationship between strategic management and economics and indicates 
areas for future research utilising the linkage between the two disciplines.  Further, Saloner 
(1991) adds that issues, intersecting the internal environment and the external environment 
are a growth area in economics. The external environment including factors such as 
competition, combined with internal factors such as incentive schemes are important inputs 
to a firm’s decision making approach.  
 Therefore, we propose that a management decision such as whether to voluntarily 
disclose segment information will depend jointly on the internal and external 
environments within which the firm operates. We measure the firm’s internal 
environment by the variable insider ownership IO which is measured by directors’ direct 
and indirect shareholdings. With high levels of IO, managerial and shareholder interests 
are closely aligned.  To examine the external environment of the firm we use a variable 
HI measuring the degree of industry competition faced by the firm which is captured 
using the Herfindahl index.  This is based on the median HI calculated using 36 industries 
based on the top 500 firms on the ASX by the following formula: 
Industry Herfindahl index ∑[rij/Rj]2  where; 
rij = Firm i’s revenue in industry j, as defined by the 4-digit SIC code 
Rj = The total of revenue for all firms in industry j 
 
  While other proxies for competition have been used in segment studies including 
the four firm concentration ratio and the speed of abnormal profit adjustment (Berger and 
Hann, 2002; Harris, 1998), we choose the Herfindahl index as it is widely used in 
research and practice including the U.S. Department of Justice who implements the 
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Herfindahl index in its antitrust activities. Therefore we believe that our internal/external 
variable IOHI when added to the model (1) will enhance the ability of the model to 
explain voluntary disclosures.  
Therefore, we will test the following model featuring our internal/external 
environment variable IOHI:  
( , , , , , , )VD f IOHI OWNDIFF RETURN FAIP AUDITOR LEV LOGTA= (2)  
5.  Empirical measures, sample selection and descriptive statistics 
5.1  Data 
To examine firms’ segment reporting practices, we use the Connect 4 database to 
access financial reports for the Top 500 Australian companies for the three years, 2001-
2003. Segment reporting information, if disclosed, is located in the notes of the financial 
reports. Of the Top 500 reports examined for the year 2001, 263 disclosed segment 
information. Under the revised standard in 2002 and 2003, 276 and 286 firms 
respectively disclosed segment information. For our entire sample, we found that 825 
firms disclosed segment information. We calculate our measure of competition (i.e. the 
Herfindahl index) based on the industry groups of the entire sample of Top 500 
Australian firms. We categorize the Top 500 Australian firms according to the 36 Global 
Industry Classification Scheme (GICS) four-digit industry groups.9 Table 2 provides a 
breakdown of our sample and their relevant industries for 2001-2003. In neither year does 
a single industry dominate in our assignment of the dependent variable. 
 5.2  Voluntary Segment Disclosure Variables 
The dependent variable used in our models is a dichotomous variable VD which 
indicates whether the firm reported other disclosures for 2001 aside from the required 
revenue, result and segment assets. Firms who reported additional disclosures are coded 
“1”, and all others are coded “0”. For 2002/2003, VD reflects disclosures that are in 
addition to the required nine primary items and two secondary items as outlined in 
section 2.1. Firms making such disclosures are coded “1”. All others are coded “0”.  
5.3  Other Explanatory Variables 
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The existing literature has tested several explanatory variables which stem from 
the agency, information asymmetry, political cost and proprietary cost theories. These 
variables will also be included in our model and are measured as follows:  
Firm size is a commonly tested variable in agency, information asymmetry and 
political cost disclosure studies. In this study, firm size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets LOGTA. Ownership diffusion OWNDIFF has been used in 
studies as a proxy for information asymmetry studies and is defined in this study as the 
proportion of shares not held by the top 20 shareholders.  Leverage LEV is a well known 
and commonly tested variable in agency cost studies and is measured as the book value 
of debt divided by market value of equity and the book value of debt. In this study we 
have also included a variable AUDITOR representing the “big five 2001” or “big four 
2002/2003” audit firm which has been previously included in other agency theory 
studies. The profitability of the firm has also been a commonly tested explanatory 
variable in studies investigating proprietary costs.  In this study as a proxy for 
profitability we will use the RETURN variable which represents the annual stock return in 
the years 2001 - 2003. The return is measured as the logarithmic stock return over the 
year and includes both dividends and price appreciation. Finally, agency studies also 
suggest the use of the proportion of fixed assets in place FAIP to explain cross-sectional 
variation in voluntary disclosure studies (Bradbury, 1992, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). 
FAIP is measured as the book value of fixed assets relative to total assets. 
  
5.4  Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 also provides statistics for the dependent variable VD. In 2001, 40.68 
percent (107) of firms provided voluntary disclosures.  In 2002, 51.44 percent (142) firms 
provided voluntary disclosures. In 2003, 67.48% (193) of firms provided voluntary 
segment disclosures.  Voluntary segment disclosures included items such as:  additional 
segment revenue, interest, amortisation of goodwill, depletion, income tax, significant 
items, segment bad debts, capital expenditure and segment cash flow from operating 
activities. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables for the 
pooled sample. For the sample, the mean insider ownership variable is 17.88 percent. The 
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mean Herfindahl index based on revenue is 33.47 percent. The mean IOHI which is the 
product of IO and HI is 6.09 percent. The mean for ownership diffusion is 37.41 percent. 
82.30 percent of the firms have big 4/big 5 auditors. The leverage ratio mean is 44.85 
percent. The mean for the fixed assets in place variable is 59.86 percent. The mean return 
is negative 0.04. 
5.5  Correlation matrix 
Table 4 presents pair wise correlations between the variables over the full sample 
period 2001 to 2003. The strongest correlations are observed for the LOGTA variable, 
which is highly correlated with both LEV (52.9%), FAIP (30.2%) and with the 
internal/external environment variable IOHI (-21.2%). Apart from LOGTA, the IOHI 
variable is relatively weakly correlated with the other variables, the exceptions being the 
variable OWNDIFF (-27.6%). This low correlation mitigates possible concerns about the 
effects of multicollinarity in the model estimation that follows. One final point to note is 
the high correlation observed between the interactive variable IOHI and its components 
IO and HI.  
6  Empirical tests and results 
This section contains analyses directed at testing the hypothesis that voluntary 
segment disclosures are related to several previously tested variables and also our new 
variable measuring the internal/external environment.  
6.1.1  IOHI variable probit results 
We first test our IOHI variable in isolation to determine whether there is a 
relationship between voluntary segment disclosures and the IOHI variable. We test our 
IOHI variable using a pooled time series cross sectional probit model for the 3 years of 
data where the voluntary disclosure variable (VD) is the dependent variable. The sole 
regressor is the interactive variable IOHI, which is the product of the inside ownership IO 
and Herfindahl index HI variables. The results of the probit regression of voluntary 
disclosure against the interactive IOHI variable are found in Table 5 Panel A.  These 
results indicate a strong significant relationship is evident between the variables (t-test = -
2.74). Importantly, the negative coefficient on the IOHI variable is of the correct sign, 
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indicating that firms in situations of low competition and with high levels of insider 
ownership are less likely to disclose voluntary segment items.   
 
6.1.2      Non-linearities in ownership 
Some investigators (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988)) find support for a 
non-linear relation between ownership and corporate performance with different 
functional forms over the range of ownership.10 As a test of robustness, therefore, we 
consider a non-linear specification of the relationship between VD and IOHI that affords 
continuity and nests the different functional forms previously examined: 
2 3
0 1 2 3 4 51 2VD IOHI IOHI IOHI D Dβ β β β β β= + + + + +  (8) 
where  
( )31 0.05D HI IO = × −   if 0.05IO >  and zero elsewhere,  
and  
( )32 0.25D HI IO = × −   if 0.25IO >  and zero elsewhere. 
Table 5 Panel B illustrates that none of the coefficients on the non-linear terms 
were significant.  Further, the result of the likelihood ratio test failed to support the 
existence of a non-linear relationship (p-value = 0.09). In addition, it shows no evidence 
of a change in the functional form over the range of ownership. 
 
6.2  Probit results  
We employ probit methodology to test the significance of the explanatory 
variables.  Our analysis is for the 3 years of data in a pooled time series, cross sectional 
probit model.  Table 6 reports the results of our two probit regressions.  In the first model 
(1) the voluntary disclosure variable (VD) is the dependent variable and previously 
commonly tested disclosure variables are the regressors.   In model (1) we find evidence 
of a relationship between voluntary disclosure and each of OWNDIFF (t=-2.32), 
RETURN (t=-2.61) and LOGTA (t=2.79). These results are as expected based on previous 
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literature.  Firm size (LOGTA), is consistent with Bradbury (1992), Aitken et.al (1994), 
Leuz (1999), McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) and Mitchell et.al (1995).   
Our second model (2) includes our variable IOHI alongside commonly tested 
disclosure variables as regressors. The results are as we hypothesised and we find that the 
IOHI variable is significant and the predicted sign (t=-2.97), indicating that firms with 
high insider shares and low competition are less likely to voluntarily disclose segment 
data. For the remaining six explanatory variables we find that the same three of them are 
significant as in model (1). Specifically, we find that there is a significant relationship 
between voluntary segment disclosures and each of OWNDIFF (t=-3.05), RETURN (t=-
2.72) and LOGTA (t=2.13).  Again, these results are consistent with the previous 
literature.  We feel that the significant result for our IOHI variable is a contribution to the 
existing literature and our results for the OWNDIFF, RETURN and LOGTA variables 
provide further justification for these variables as determinants of voluntary disclosure. 
6.2.1 Likelihood ratio tests 
 We then perform a likelihood ratio test of the models.  The likelihood ratio tests 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the IOHI variable is zero. Therefore we 
construct a likelihood ratio statistic: 
( )2 ln lnR ULR L L= − − ,  (3) 
Where UL  is equation (2) featuring the IOHI variable plus the other explanatory variables 
identified in the prior literature as being able to explain voluntary disclosure and RL   is 
equation (1) based only on the explanatory variables. 
Table 6 reports the results of the likelihood ratio test. Our null hypothesis, that the 
IOHI variable fails to add to the explanatory power of the existing variables, is soundly 
rejected (p-value = 0.00).  This provides evidence that the addition of our IOHI variable 
which captures both the internal and external environments of the firm does enhance the 
ability of the model and is therefore useful in explaining the existence of voluntary 
segment disclosures.  
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7. Robustness tests 
 We conduct a series of robustness tests on our IOHI variable and find that the 
significance of the IOHI variable is robust to the inclusion of variables measuring the 
change in standard, acquisitions and disposals of other firms and cross listing on the US 
stock exchange. 
 
7.1 Change in standard 
The revised segment reporting standard AASB 1005 Segment Reporting has 
significantly affected segment reporting practices of Australian firms. Therefore, as an 
additional test of robustness we investigate whether the changes in the standard impact on 
the relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable. To 
accomplish this, a dummy variable approach is used whereby the dummy variable D 
takes a value of “1” in the period before the change in standard and ”0” after the change. 
Again we construct a likelihood ratio test and the result is shown in Table 7, column 2. 
The LR result (p-value = 0.00) shows a rejection of the restrictions. It does not tell us 
whether this is due to a change in the relevance of the variables in the model or to an 
increase in VD generally. 
To identify the cause of the structural break, we conduct additional regression and 
likelihood ratio tests on the restriction that the change in the slope coefficients are jointly 
zero. These results are shown in column 3 of Table 7.  The LR result (p-value = 0.30) 
demonstrates that the change in the intercept can be interpreted as an overall increase in 
underlying/natural disclosure which is unrelated to the internal or external environment 
and indeed to the underlying characteristics of the firm itself. There could be several 
logical reasons for the increase in voluntary disclosure after the implementation of the 
revised standard. A probable reason is that the revised segment standard is more explicit 
about voluntary disclosures and encourages the disclosure of segment cash flows and any 
other relevant items as illustrated in sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 of the standard. In summary, 
the economic model featuring OWNDIFF, RETURN, LOGTA and IOHI is robust to a 
change in standard and continues to apply with the same strength on each variable. 
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7.2 Acquisition and disposal dummies and voluntary disclosures 
 
We further test the robustness of the model by taking into consideration acquisition 
and disposal activities of the firms.11  We constructed acquisition and disposal dummies 
for the pooled sample. The acquisition dummy variable is coded “1” if the firm makes a 
physical asset acquisition during the year and “0” otherwise. Similarly, the disposal 
dummy is coded “1” if the firm disposes of physical assets during the year, and “0” 
otherwise. We test whether the acquisition or disposal variables influence voluntary 
segment disclosures. Table 7, column 4 reports our results and highlights that with the 
acquisition and disposal restriction, the variables IOHI (t=-2.97), OWNDIFF (t=-3.04) 
and RETURN (t=-3.10) remain significant. Our firm size variable LOGTA no longer 
shows up as significant (t=1.78).  However, large firms are more likely to be involved in 
acquisition/disposal activity and therefore these variables are likely to be highly 
correlated. Therefore, to  more reliably test the impact of the ACQ and DISP variables we 
use the likelihood ratio test and find that the restriction that the variables ACQ and DISP 
are jointly zero is not rejected (p-value = 0.27). 
 
7.3 Cross Listing 
 
We further test the robustness of our model by distinguishing cross listed firms from 
single listed firms.  Previous research (Bradbury 1992, Leuz, 1999) has identified that an 
overseas listing is a significant explanatory variable for voluntary segment disclosures. 
We construct a CROSS dummy variable for the pooled sample. The CROSS dummy 
variable is coded “1” if the firm is cross listed and “0” otherwise. The results of this 
regression are found in Table 7, column 5.   Even with the CROSS restriction, we find 
that our IOHI variable is still significant (t=-2.92) and the variables OWNDIFF (t.=-3.16) 
and RETURN (t=-2.96) also remain significant. Our firm size variable LOGTA (t=1.41) is 
not significant but again this could be due to the fact that larger firms cross list and 
therefore we would expect a high correlation between the LOGTA and CROSS variables. 
To more reliably gauge the impact of the CROSS we use the likelihood ratio test and find 
that the restriction that the CROSS variable coefficient is zero is marginally rejected (p-
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value = 0.05).  Therefore, whether a firm is cross listed on a foreign stock exchange, does 
seem to influence the existence of voluntary disclosures. However, based on the previous 
literature’s vast usage of the size variable our preference is to use size in our model rather 
than the cross variable. 
 
 
7.4  IOHI, IO and HI variables 
 
We conduct a final test of robustness to determine whether the variables IOHI, IO 
and HI are complimentary in their ability to explain disclosure. We add the variables IO 
and HI to the regression individually. Table 7, column 6 shows that when the two 
variables are added to the model, the IOHI variable is no longer significant. This result 
could be due to the fact that there are high levels of correlation between the IOHI, IO and 
HI variables similar to the scenario between SIZE and CROSS and SIZE and ACQ and 
DISP variables in the earlier discussion. In fact the correlation between the IO and IOHI 
variables is 0.837 and between the HI and IOHI variables is 0.395. Therefore, to more 
reliably test whether the variables IOHI, IO and HI are complimentary in their ability to 
explain disclosure we conduct a likelihood ratio test and find the restriction that the HI 
and IO variables and IOHI are jointly zero is unable to be rejected (p-value = 0.09). The 
LR result is consistent with the strategic management and industrial organization theory 
which motivates the joint effect of the internal/external variable not the individual effect 
of the IO and HI variables. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
The literature examining the determinants of discretionary disclosures offers a 
number of different theories including agency, information asymmetry, political costs, 
and proprietary costs. In this study, we examine a model featuring a new variable IOHI 
which we feel captures jointly the internal and external environment of the firm. 
Literature in the industrial organization and strategic management disciplines suggest that 
external factors such as competition joint with internal factors such as incentive schemes 
e.g. directors’ shareholdings are important inputs to a firm’s decision making approach 
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(Saloner, 1991). We hypothesize that the inclusion of the IOHI variable to the model 
enhances the ability of the model to explain voluntary segment disclosures. Our empirical 
results indicate a strong significant result is evident between IOHI and voluntary segment 
disclosures. When we add our IOHI variable to other commonly tested variables we 
obtain significant results for our IOHI variable, SIZE, RETURN and OWNDIFF.  
Furthermore, when we test our economic model against a model based only on 
commonly tested variables,  we find that the null hypothesis, that the IOHI variable fails 
to add to the explanatory power of the existing variables, is soundly rejected.  This 
provides evidence that our IOHI variable capturing both the internal and external 
environments of the firm, does enhance the ability of the model and is therefore useful in 
explaining the existence of voluntary segment disclosures. Our findings are robust to 
changes in the Australian segment reporting standard, capital market changes of 
acquisitions and disposals of physical assets and to non-linearities in ownership. 
The results of our study are timely as countries worldwide are moving towards 
harmonization of accounting standards. Theories that help explain globally how firm’s 
disclose will contribute to our understanding of information presented in financial 
reports. Our findings contribute to the disclosure literature by suggesting the inclusion of 
a variable in a voluntary disclosure model which captures a firm’s internal and external 
environments. Further research could investigate whether our internal/external variable 
could be used to explain voluntary segment disclosures under other jurisdictions (e.g., the 
U.S. as well as countries adopting IFRS). The new test methodology may also prove 
useful in studies examining other discretionary disclosures.   
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TABLE 1. Summary of estimation results in studies of corporate disclosure. Sign 
and significance (at the five percent probability level) of variables are: ++ significantly 
positive, + positive but insignificant, - negative but insignificant, and – significantly 
negative. 
 
 
 
Market legend:
N = NYSE
A =ASX
NZ = NEW ZEALAND
G = GERMANY
Market NZ A G A N A N
No. of firms 29 65 109 65 929 129 1207
Agency variables Variable definition
Firm size Log of total assets ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ --
Leverage Book value of debt to sum of 
book value of debt and market 
value of equity
++ ++ - + ++
Assets in place Book value of fixed assets to 
total assets
+ + ++ +
Profitability Net profit to total assets --
Minority interest 1-% of subs not held by Top 20 
shareholders
+ ++ ++
Free float Percent of voting shares held for 
free trading
++
Number of shareholders Natural logarithm of number of 
shareholders
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Number of subsidiaries ++
Market-to-book Ratio of market/book equity +
Proprietary Cost Variables Variable definition
Competition – 4 firm 
concentration ratio
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Competition – speed of profit 
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Speed of profit adjustment -- ++
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Herfindahl index Industry concentration +
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Overseas association Overseas listing + + + ++
Earnings volatility Five-year coeff of variation - - -
Trading volume Share turnover +
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TABLE 2. Summary of number of firms in sample by year and industry category. 
The voluntary disclosure variable VD denotes firms that disclosed information in addition 
to that required by the standard. TOTAL indicates the number of firms in each industry, 
while COUNT shows the total count across all industries. IO is the median insider 
ownership (expressed in percentages) in each industry and HI is the concentration level in 
each industry (expressed in percentages) based upon the median HI calculated using 36 
industries using based on the top 500 firms on the ASX.  
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TOTAL 30 17 15 38 41 6 13 23 6 25 14 20 49 12 14 14 27 45 33 11 25 39 25 14 32 20 46 13 27 23 8 12 32 22 18 16 825
IO (%) 2 3 3 1 5 2 3 11 11 10 30 20 2 6 0 36 3 37 23 0 13 13 13 20 3 0 4 0 2 30 7 27 39 18 3 5
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TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables.  
The variables in our model include: IO, the percentage of shares held directly or 
indirectly by the directors of the company; HI, the level of Herfindahl revenue; and, 
IOHI, the product of IO and HI. In the benchmark model, the variables are: OWNDIFF, 
the percentage of ownership diffusion; RETURN, the log stock return over the year; 
FAIP, the fixed assets in place; LOGTA, the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV, the 
book value of debt divided by the market value and the book value of debt; and, 
AUDITOR, whether the firm is audited by a big 5 or big 4 auditor.  
 
 
Variable No. of obs. Mean Std Dev Min 25% Median 75% Max
IO 825 0.1788 0.2217 0 0.0038 0.0725 0.3104 0.9513
HI 825 0.3347 0.1526 0.0885 0.2189 0.3167 0.4513 0.7024
IOHI 825 0.0609 0.0900 0 0.0011 0.0179 0.0875 0.5606
OWNDIFF 825 0.3741 0.2023 0 0.2200 0.3530 0.5100 0.9800
RETURN 825 -0.0419 0.6015 -2.0242 -0.2541 0.0366 0.2685 2.379
FAIP 825 0.5986 0.2420 0 0.4257 0.6212 0.8005 1
LOGTA 825 12.7371 2.0823 8.2779 11.2248 12.4284 14.0398 19.8006
LEV 825 0.4485 0.2247 0.0068 0.2898 0.4599 0.5949 0.9837
AUDITOR 825 0.8230 0.3819 0 1 1 1 1
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TABLE 4. Pairwise correlation structure among variables.  
IO is the percentage of shares held directly or indirectly by the directors of the company, HI is 
the level of Herfindahl revenue, and IOHI is the product of IO and HI, OWNDIFF is the 
percentage of ownership diffusion, RETURN is the stock return over the year, FAIP is the fixed 
assets in place, LOGTA is the natural logarithm of total assets, LEV is the book value of debt 
divided by total assets, and AUDITOR indicates whether firm is audited by a big 5 or big 4 
auditor.  
 
Variable IO HI IOHI OWNDIFF RETURN FAIP LOGTA LEV
HI 0.032
IOHI 0.837 0.395
OWNDIFF -0.346 0.006 -0.276
RETURN -0.091 0.031 -0.058 0.004
FAIP -0.111 0.036 -0.048 -0.043 0.093
LOGTA -0.307 0.101 -0.212 0.051 0.111 0.302
LEV -0.056 0.041 -0.041 0.047 0.033 -0.031 0.529
AUDITOR -0.125 0.043 -0.072 0.013 -0.006 0.044 0.235 0.210
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TABLE 5. Results of the IOHI regression and test for potential non-linearities. The voluntary disclosure variable (VD) is the 
dependent variable in both regressions. Panel A reports the results of a regression of the voluntary exposure variable VD against the 
interaction variable IOHI, where IOHI is the product of inside ownership IO and the Herfindahl index HI,. Panel B contains the 
results of a test for potential nonlinearities. IOHI2 and IOHI3 are the IOHI variable squared and cubed, respectively, 
( ) 31 .05D HI IO= × −    if .05IO >  and is zero otherwise, and ( ) 32 .25D HI IO= × −    if .25IO >  and equals zero otherwise. LLF is 
the log likelihood function. The likelihood ratio test statistic (LR) is calculated as ( )2LR RLLF ULLF= − −  and is distributed as a 24χ  
under the null, where RLLF (ULLF) is the restricted (unrestricted) log likelihood function. 
 
 
PANEL A
IOHI LLF
VD 825 0.172 -1.357 -565.92
(3.24) (-2.74)
PANEL B
Dependent 
variable No. of obs. Constant IOHI IOHI 2 IOHI 3 D1 D2 LLF LR p-value
VD 825 0.156 -1.245 18.790 -892.597 1392.036 -555.609 -561.89 8.06 0.09
(2.50) (-0.44) (0.86) (-1.90) (1.64) (-1.29)
Coefficient estimate (and t-ratio) for:
Coefficient estimate (and t-ratio) for:
Dependent 
variable No. of obs. Constant
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TABLE 6. Results of the likelihood ratio tests of the restricted and unrestricted 
regressions. The voluntary disclosure variable (VD) is the dependent variable in both 
regressions. The restricted model includes an intercept term, OWNDIFF, FAIP, AUDITOR, 
RETURN,  LEV and LOGTA. The unrestricted model includes an intercept term, IOHI, 
OWNDIFF, FAIP, AUDITOR, RETURN,  LEV and LOGTA. The likelihood ratio test statistic 
(LR) is calculated as ( )2LR RLLF ULLF= − −  and is distributed as a 21χ  under the null, where 
RLLF (ULLF) is the restricted (unrestricted) log likelihood function.  
 
 
Restricted Model Unrestricted Model
VD VD
No. of obs. 825 825
Constant -0.706 -0.352
(-2.36) (-1.09)
IOHI -1.583
(-2.97)
OWNDIFF -0.511 -0.701
(-2.32) (-3.05)
FAIP -0.324 -0.308
(-1.64) (-1.55)
AUDITOR 0.047 0.035
(0.39) (0.29)
RETURN -0.196 -0.205
(-2.61) (-2.72)
LEV 0.333 0.406
(1.39) (1.68)
LOGTA 0.077 0.060
(2.79) (2.13)
LLF -553.69 -549.19
LR 9.00
p-value 0.00
Independent Variables
Dependent variable
 
TABLE 7. Results of robustness tests. 
The structural break dummy D takes a value of 1 in the period before the change in 
standard and 0 otherwise. Similarly the acquisition dummy variable ACQ takes a value of 
one if a company makes a physical asset acquisition during the year while the disposal 
dummy variable DISP takes a value of one for those firms that dispose of physical assets
during the year. CROSS denotes firms that cross-listed. LLF is the log likelihood 
function. The likelihood ratio test statistic (LR) is calculated as ( )2LR RLLF ULLF= − −
and is distributed as a 2kχ  under the null, where k is the number of coefficients being 
restricted. For each regression, the coefficients being restricted are presented in bold.  
VD VD VD VD VD
No. of obs. 825 825 825 825 825
Constant -0.053 -0.188 -0.131 -0.020 -0.286
(-1.27) (-0.57) (-0.40) (-0.06) (-0.78)
IOHI -1.424 -1.607 -1.604 -1.571 -1.880
(-2.17) (-2.98) (-2.97) (-2.92) (-1.48)
OWNDIFF -0.839 -0.711 -0.707 -0.735 -0.614
(-2.92) (-3.06) (-3.04) (-3.16) (-2.57)
FAIP -0.641 -0.295 -0.287 -0.279 -0.295
(-2.45) (-1.47) (-1.43) (-1.38) (-1.46)
AUDITOR -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 0.011
(-0.04) (-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.09) (0.09)
RETURN -0.203 -0.231 -0.237 -0.226 -0.225
(-1.96) (-3.03) (-3.10) (-2.96) (-2.94)
LEV 0.547 0.462 0.464 0.514 0.415
(1.79) (1.89) (1.90) (2.09) (1.69)
LOGTA 0.104 0.061 0.053 0.043 0.076
(2.68) (2.12) (1.78) (1.41) (2.56)
D 0.087 -0.507 -0.505 -0.503 -0.507
(0.12) (-5.25) (-5.22) (-5.20) (-5.24)
D*IOH I -0.485
(-0.42)
D*OWND IFF 0.415
(0.84)
D*FAIP 0.790
(1.86)
D*AU DITOR -0.055
(-0.22)
D*RETURN -0.066
(-0.43)
D*LEV -0.355
(-0.70)
D*LOGTA -0.078
(-1.32)
ACQ 0.084
(0.81)
DISP 0.085
(0.65)
CROSS 0.287
(1.97)
IO 0.364
(0.74)
HI -0.518
(-1.28)
LLF -531.11 -535.28 -534.66 -533.32 -532.85
LR 36.16 8.34 1.24 3.92 4.86
p-value 0.00 0.30 0.27 0.05 0.09
Independent variables
Dependent variable
 1
 
Endnotes 
 
                                                 
1 See Botosan (1997), Deegan and Gordon (1996) and Kelly (1994). 
2 See Bradbury (1992), McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), and Aitken et al (1997). 
3 See Kochanek (1974) and Aitken et al (1994). 
4 The “management approach” has been adopted from the U.S. standard SFAS 131 and the international 
standard IAS 14 . 
5 A geographic segment is classified as primary if the entity’s risks and returns are affected predominantly by 
the fact that it operates in different countries or other geographical areas. A business segment would be primary 
if the entity’s risks and returns are affected predominantly by the differences in the products and services it 
provides. This is based on the assumption that the predominant source of risks and returns determine how an 
entity is organized and managed and is hence known as the management approach. This follows similar 
standards adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (SFAS 131) and also the International 
Standards Committee (IAS 14R). 
6 See Belkaoui and Karpik (1989). 
7 See Healy and Palepu (2001). 
8 See, also, Hayes and Lundholm (1996) and Ronen and Livnat (1981). 
9 We use two different definitions of industry categories but apply to two different samples. Under the first 
definition, the four-digit GICS is applied to the sample of segment disclosing firms. Under the second, the 
four-digit GICS applied to the Top 500 firms. The third definition uses the GICS two-digit industry sector 
classification scheme applied to the sample of segment disclosing firms. (The GICS two-digit classification 
scheme classifies firms into the following industry sectors: materials, energy, industrials, consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, health care, utilities, financials and information technology.) The final 
definition uses this classification of GICS applied to the Top 500 firms. Since the results are remarkably 
consistent across the four measures, we report only the results for the most general (second) definition (i.e., 
four digit GICS applied to the Top 500 firms). 
10 The development of this cubic spline model and its knot points is contained in Smith and Kohn (1996). 
11  The acquisition and disposal dummy was suggested by Professor Gordon Richardson at the AFAANZ 
conference, Brisbane, 2003. 
